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Abstract
Observers increasingly have expressed concern about what has been 
described as the militarization of the third world Yet it is 
seldom clear what is meant by the term "militarization " This 
paper represents an attempt to cut through the multitude of 
conflicting conceptualizations, provide a more precise and
operational meaning of the term, and differentiate between
militarization and militarism Two forms of militarization are 
identified and the multiple dimensions of militarization are
operationalized and utilized in an evaluation of the nature and 
extent of contemporary third world militarization It is shown 
that militarization m  the third world is not advancing as 
rapidly as it once was and may not be the problem some have
assumed it to be
Many observers of the world military order have become 
increasingly concerned with a phenomenon known as "militariza­
tion " Concern has been voiced about global militarization,1 
but more often it is expressly third world militarization that 
has evoked the greatest concern 2 This preoccupation with third 
world militarization derives from explicitly normative considera­
tions Some claim that militarization is the greatest problem 
confronting the third world today, that the South "is squandering 
its resources on the quest for internal and external secu­
rity 1,3 and that most third world countries are " being
overwhelmed by excessive military burdens "4 Others see milita­
rization as a disease, a disease that, like all diseases, must be 
eradicated 5
Yet despite the near-universal condemnation of militarism, 
it is not always clear what militarization is Even though 
analysts have devoted considerable effort to distinguishing 
between different types of militarization, identifying its 
sources or causes, and worrying about its effects, there is a 
great deal of conceptual confusion surrounding use of the term 
The relationship between militarization and militarism is also 
unclear
This paper represents an attempt to cut through the welter 
of sometimes conflicting conceptualizations to provide a more 
precise and operational meaning of the term "militarization " An 
effort is also made to differentiate between militarization and 
militarism Most importantly, having operationalized the 
concept, the multiple dimensions of militarization, or at least
one form of militarization, are identified and utilized m  an 
evaluation of the nature and extent of contemporary third world 
militarization My objectives, therefore, are limited to 
clarification, operationalization, and measurement and do not 
encompass an investigation of the causes or consequences of 
militarization 6 In pursuing even these limited objectives, 
however, it will be shown that although some concern about 
militarization is warranted, militarization in the third world is 
not advancing as rapidly as it once was and may not be the great 
problem some have made it out to be
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THE MEANING OF MILITARIZATION
Militarization remains, for many, an ambiguous and somewhat 
nebulous term Many of those who have utilized the term have 
failed to define it or have done so in rather general terms 
Analysts who have attempted to define or otherwise indicate the 
meaning of the term provide have provided us with unclear, 
incomplete, or contradictory conceptualizations We have been 
offered broad, all-encompassing and narrow definitions, vague and 
relatively specific definitions, nonoperational and empirically 
based, operational definitions, normative and more-or-less 
objective definitions, definitions that stress either the 
domestic or international aspects, and definitions that include 
both internal and external dimensions Some have eguated 
mil1^ariza'hion and militarism, using the two terms interchange­
ably, while others have attempted to distinguish between the two 
concepts A few analysts, finally, seem to have denied the
utility of precisely delineating the concepts of militarization 
and militarism 7
Jagat Mehta, in what is the lead-off piece for a collection 
of conference papers, neglected to even attempt to denote the 
concept of militarization 8 Miles Wolpin used the term to refer 
to ” a process in which increasing state resources are 
allocated to the armed forces and/or military related activi­
ties "9 Augusto Varas, simply and prejudicially, defined
militarization as " an overemphasis on the importance of armed 
forces " For Varas, militarization "entails both growing
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military power —  a response to multiple political- diplomatic 
and economic situations both regional and extracontinental —  and 
growing military involvement in, and control of, domestic 
politics "10 SIPRI used the term militarization broadly, to 
indicate " a steady growth in the military potential of 
states Such growth is usually accompanied by an increasing role 
for military institutions both in national affairs, including 
the economic, social and political spheres, and in international 
affairs 1,11 For Francis Beer, "Militarization includes interna­
tional legal justification for war, alliances, military trade and 
aid, and militance, dominance of military elites and militaristic 
behavior m  domestic government, economy, society, and cui- 
ture "12
In contrast to the conceptualizations provided by SIPRI, 
Varas, and Beer, which included domestic and international 
dimensions, for Chulacheeb Chinwanno ” militarization refers to 
the process of transformation of society from a civilian to a 
military orientation" and is defined as "the process by which 
norms, institutions, and other aspects of society are penetrated, 
dominated, or influenced by the military establishment "13 
Similarly, Richard Falk has discussed militarization in terms of 
repressive, militaristic governance, thereby emphasizing the 
internal dimensions of militarization 14
Richard Tanter, on the other hand, recognized, at least 
implicitly, the international as well as the domestic dimen­
sions Tanter used militarization to refer to two related
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phenomena
The first dimension of militarization is the 
technological and the fiscal the prolifera­
tion of weapons, of increased destructive capa­
city, requiring greater state expenditures on 
equipment and personnel The second dimension 
is at the level of social structure and govern­
ment the prevalence of governments using or­
ganized force rather than ideological hegemony 
to secure the domination of major social groups 
The spread of military organization in a society 
links both conceptions 15
Wallensteen, Galtung, and Portales more explicitly recognized the 
international and domestic dimensions m  their identification of 
two forms of militarization (1) social formation and structure 
—  "institutionalized and routinized relations within states and 
between states, m  which military behavior comes to be prefer­
red," and (2) behavior —  "the preference for violent courses of 
action at the expense of nonviolent ways of influence "16 
Wallensteen and his colleagues, however, have not clearly 
differentiated between these two forms of militarization —  a 
behavioral preference for violent, or military, action is common 
to both, and is the essence of both forms But most importantly, 
the emphasis on the behavioral aspects of these two forms of 
militarization would seem more appropriate m  the conceptualiza­
tion of militarism than militarization
Several observers have taken on the difficult, but neces­
sary, task of distinguishing between militarization and milita­
rism 17 For Eide and Thee, "Militarisation manifests itself in 
the increase in armaments, advances m  the destructive capacity 
of weapons, growing number of people under arms, and dramatic
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increases in military expenditure 1,18 Eide and Thee, implicitly 
at least, seem to view militarism as "The inclination to rely on 
military means of coercion for the handling of conflicts"19 —  a 
view which would appear to stress behavioral preference, or 
"inclination," for violent, military, courses of action Later 
in the same volume, Thee identified militarism as " a rush to 
armaments, the growing role of the military in national and 
international affairs, the use of force as an instrument of 
supremacy and political power, and the increasing influence of 
the military in civilian affairs " Militarization, on the other 
hand, is viewed " as being an extension of military influence 
to civilian spheres 1,20 While Thee's conceptualization of 
militarism is in accord with that he offered m  conjunction with 
Eide, and Eide and Thee's characterization of militarization is 
distinct from their characterization of militarism, Thee's 
definition of militarization is not clearly differentiated from 
his definition of militarism Furthermore, Michael Klare has 
subsumed Thee's characterization of militarization m  his 
delineation of the concept of militarism For Klare, the notion 
of militarism includes " the notion of excess. of the growing 
encroachment of the military over civilian institutions a 
dynamic condition characterized by the progressive expansion of 
the military sphere over the civilian "21 Alfred Vagts, in his 
classic work on the history of militarism, wrote that " mili­
tarism has connoted a domination of the military over the 
civilian, an undue preponderance of military demands, and
emphasis on military considerations, spirits, ideals, and scales 
of value, in the life of states ”22 Both Klare and Vagts have 
included Thee's notion of militarization in their characteriza­
tions of militarism
The task of distinguishing between militarization and
militarism and determining the nature of the relationship between
the two concepts is not rendered any less difficult by the
depiction of the relationship provided by a group of analysts
assembled by the World Council of Churches In their 1977
report, militarism was described as the result of militarization
Militarisation should be understood as the 
process whereby military values, ideology, 
and patterns of behaviour achieve a dominating 
influence on the political, social, economic 
and external affairs of the State, and as a 
consequence the structural, ideological and 
behavioural patterns of both the society and 
the government are 'militarised ,23
Here the World Council of Churches' group of experts has posited 
that which Klare and Vagts labeled militarism to be militariza­
tion and the cause of militarism 24
The task of clarifying the distinction between militariza­
tion and militarism can be accomplished by distinguishing between 
two different forms, or manifestations, of militarization The 
first is militarization as process —  the form of militarization 
described by the World Council of Churches' group of experts, 
Thee, Chinwanno, Wallensteen and his coauthors, and Tanter in his 
second dimension of militarization, the form of militarization 
that results in militarism as characterized by Eide and Thee, 
Klare, and Vagts This first form of militarization is the form
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that contributes to the militarism characteristic of Skjelbaek's 
first two forms of militarism (1) militaristic behavior, 
defined as "the excess use of violence,"25 and (2) militarism of 
the mind, i e , militaristic ideologies, values, and beliefs 
about human nature and social relationships 26 The first form of 
militarization identified here, the process form, therefore, does 
result in, or at least contribute to, the militarism of Eide and 
Thee, Klare, and Vagts, and must, as Dieter Senghaas has argued, 
” be understood within an analysis of militarism 1,27
But it is typically not militarism, and therefore not this 
first form of militarization, militarization as process, that is 
evident m  the third world What is present in the third world, 
and of central concern here, is the second form of militarization 
—  military buildup This is the form of militarization identi­
fied by Eide and Thee, Wolpin, Varas, SIPRI, and in Tanter's 
first dimension of militarization 28 Skjelsbaek's third dimen­
sion of militarism, structural militarism, both the national 
level (which concerns the relative size of the military sector 
and the relationship between the military and other sectors) and 
the international level (which concerns inter-alliance and mtra- 
alliance relations),29 can more accurately be considered a compo­
nent of the second form of militarization than of militarism 
This second form of militarization, military buildup, is charac­
terized by increases m  military spending, the size of the armed 
forces, arms imports, arms production, by an enlargement m  the 
military's demands upon society and the economy, and, conse-
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quently, by a possible accompanying increase m  the political 
role and influence of the military and the actual appropriation 
of the state apparatus by the military It is this form of 
militarization that enables third world countries to engage m  
domestic and interstate violence of the most modern, industrial­
ized variety The second form of militarization therefore, like 
the first, can contribute to the militarism described by Eide and 
Thee, Klare, and Vagts Yet there is likely to be a mutually 
reinforcing, reciprocal relationship between the second form of 
militarization and militarism, not simply the unilinear, causal 
relationship found between the first form of militarization and 
militarism, where process militarization results m  militarism 30
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THE DIMENSIONS OF MILITARIZATION
This characterization of the second form of militarization 
allows us to identify operational dimensions of militarization 
Unlike some of the conceptualizations noted above, it is rela­
tively precise and unambiguous It is also free of the norma­
tive, judgmental elements that can be detected in most character­
izations —  elements that are also evident m  depictions of 
militarism, most notably those by Vagts and Klare
The following six categories of indicators can be used to 
operationalize the dimensions of the second form of militariza­
tion
A Military Expenditures (MILEX)
—  value of MILEX
—  MILEX as a proportion of GNP
—  MILEX as a proportion of central government expenditures 
(CGE)
—  MILEX growth rates
B Armed Forces
—  size of the armed forces
—  armed forces per 1000 people
C Arms Imports
—  value of arms imports
—  arms imports as a proportion of total imports
—  arms import growth rates
D Arms Production
—  value of arms production
—  arms production as a proportion of GDP
—  arms production as a proportion of total industrial produc­
tion
E Wars
—  number of interstate wars over time
—  number of intrastate wars over time
—  length of interstate and intrastate wars
—  casualties resulting from interstate and intrastate wars
F Military Regimes
—  number of military regimes
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—  change in number of military regimes over time
These six sets of indicators can be used to gauge the extent 
of militarization m  the third world They will be used here to 
measure the level and extent of third world militarization for 
the developing world as a whole and for five regions of the third 
world
Military Expenditures
As shown in Table 1, the military expenditures of developing 
countries increased from $95 3 billion m  1973 to a high of 
$164 9 billion m  1982 before dropping to $162 6 billion in 
1983 Despite the real increase in third world military spending 
during this period, however, the rate of growth of military 
spending has actually declined since 1963 Third world military 
spending increased at an average annual rate of 7 2 percent 
during the period 1963-1973 Between 1973 and 1983, third world 
military expenditures increased at an average annual rate of 4 7 
percent (see Table 2) But the rate of increase slowed to only 
2 1 percent per year during the years 1980-1983 (see Table 2) 
As a result of the slowdown in the rate of growth of third world 
defense spending, MILEX increased at a higher annual rate for 
developed countries than for developing countries during the 
years 1980-1983 —  4 1 as opposed to 2 1 percent 31 And even
though MILEX as a proportion of GNP and per capita MILEX were 
higher m  1983 than m  1973, the proportion of central government 
expenditures (CGE) devoted to MILEX declined from 22 5 to 18 5
11
percent during these years and MILEX/GNP increased only slightly 
(see Table 2)
Similar spending patterns can be discerned for the five 
regions of the third world identified in Tables 1 and 2 32 
African military spending more than doubled between 1973 and 
1983, climbing from $7 4 billion to $16 2 billion, and per capita 
MILEX also increased Yet MILEX/GNP and MILEX/CGE increased only 
marginally African military spending increased at an average 
annual rate of 6 5 percent from 1963-1973, 7 3 percent from
1973-1983, but dropped to only 3 2 percent from 1980-1983
Defense spending in East Asia increased from $46 9 billion 
m  1973 to $64 6 billion in 1983 Per capita MILEX also in­
creased during this period, but MILEX/GNP and MILEX/CGE actually 
declined —  from 4 0 to 3 5 percent and 22 4 to 16 2 percent,
respectively Although the average annual rate of growth of
defense spending increased from 7 5 percent during the years 
1963-1973 to 11 8 percent during the years 1973-1983, it in­
creased by a mere 2 1 percent per year during the years 1980- 
1983
In Latin America, defense spending in 1982 was $4 billion 
higher than it was in 1973 —  $12 0 billion as opposed to $8 0
billion —  but actually dropped $1 5 billion from 1982 to 1983
Spending increased at an average annual rate of 3 9 percent 
during the period 1963-1973, and 3 4 percent during the period 
1973-1983 But between 1980 and 1983, Latin American countries 
yielded a negative defense spending growth rate —  an average
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yearly "growth" rate of -0 7 percent In addition, MILEX/GNP and 
per capita MILEX were virtually identical in 1973 and 1983, and 
MILEX/GNP declined from 8 0 to 4 9 percent
The pattern was much the same in the Middle East Defense 
spending increased from $23 8 billion in 1973 to $62 9 billion in 
1982 But, as in Latin America, defense spending m  the Middle 
East actually declined from 1982-1983 Military spending 
increased at an average annual rate of 14 7 percent from 1963- 
1973, 7 6 percent from 1973-1983, and then only 3 7 percent from 
1980-1983 Although per capita MILEX in 1983 was almost double 
what it was in 1973, MILEX/GNP increased only slightly, from 14 1 
percent in 1973 to 15 7 percent m  1983, and MILEX/CGE declined 
from 36 1 to 26 9 percent during the course of these years
South Asia is the only region that does not conform to the 
pattern South Asian military spending increased from $4 9 
billion in 1973 to $8 8 billion m  1983 Even though there was 
little change in MILEX/GNP and per capita military spending, and 
MILEX/CGE declined during the years 1973-1983, the rate of growth 
of defense spending continued to increase Military expenditures 
increased at an average yearly rate of only 2 9 percent during 
the period 1963-1973, 5 3 percent during the period 1973-1983, 
and then 9 5 percent during the years 1980-1983
Despite the South Asian exception to the general pattern, it 
is clear that there has been a dramatic slowdown m  the advance 
of militarization as measured by the dimension of military 
spending Militarization is still on the rise in the third
13
world, but it appears to be advancing less rapidly than formerly, 
at least along this dimension In four of the five regions of 
the developing world, military spending absorbs less than five 
percent of GNP And even though countries m  four of the five 
regions in 1983 devoted 14 9 percent or more of total government 
spending to defense (Latin America was the exception), the 
proportion of CGE accounted for by defense spending was lower in 
1983 than m  1973 in four out of five regions (East Asia, Latin 
America, the Middle East, and South Asia)
Armed Forces
As with militarization measured in terms of military 
expenditures, militarization measured according to the size of 
the armed forces and armed forces growth rates reveals that 
militarization is still increasing, but at a slower rate The 
third world's military forces, as shown in Table 3, were larger 
m  1983 than in 1973 for the developing world as a whole and in 
four out of the five regions (South Asia was the exception) Yet 
the rate of growth of the third world's armed forces has de­
clined The average annual rate of growth of the armed forces 
was lower during the years 1980-1983 than during the years 
1963-1973 or 1973-1983 for the third world in general and for 
three out of five regions —  Africa, East Asia, and the Middle 
East The average yearly growth rates for Latin American and 
South Asian militaries were higher during the years 1980-1983 
than during the two other time periods, but African, East Asian,
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and Middle Eastern militaries all experienced negative growth 
rates (see Table 4) An evaluation of this second dimension of 
militarization, therefore, shows that growth m  the armed forces 
component of militarization has been reduced to a slow crawl
Arms Imports
The third world imported $266 5 billion worth of arms during 
the years 1973-198333 —  78 6 percent of total world arms imports 
during those years 34 The value of arms imports was higher in 
1983 than in 1973 for the developing world as a whole and for 
four out of five regions —  Africa, Latin America, the Middle 
East, and South Asia (see Table 5) But a closer look at the 
data for the arms import dimension of militarization reveals a 
few wrinkles
First, the value of arms imports was less in 1983 than in 
1982 for the third world as a whole and for each of the five 
regions 35 Second, the percentage of total imports attributed 
to arms imports was lower m  1983 than m  1973 for the developing 
world m  general and for three of the five regions —  East Asia, 
the Middle East, and South Asia Arms imports accounted for 2 2 
percent of total Latin American imports in 1973 and 3 5 percent 
in 1983, a rather slight increase In Africa, too, the percen­
tage of total imports accounted for by arms imports was greater 
in 1983 (6 6 percent) than in 1973 (2 2 percent) , but the figure 
for 1983 does represent a drop from that for 1978 (9 8 percent) 
Furthermore, only in the Middle East did arms imports comprise
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more than 7 percent of total imports m  1983 Third, arms 
import growth rates have declined across-the-board
Arms import growth rates have dropped for both the third 
world as a whole and for each of the five regions Third world 
arms imports grew at an average annual rate of 7 0 percent during 
the years 1973-1983 During the latter part of this period, 
1980-1983, however, annual growth rates declined to 0 0 percent 
The same pattern is evident for each of the five regions 
Average yearly arms import growth rates were m  every case lower 
for the years 1980-1983 than for the entire period 1973-1983 
And three regions, Africa, East Asia, and South Asia, experienced 
negative growth rates 36
An examination of this third dimension of militarization, 
therefore, again leads to the conclusion that the rate of growth 
of third world militarization is on the decline
Arms Production
Analysts have devoted an increasing amount of attention to 
the growth of the third world's defense industries 37 That 
attention is justified by the tremendous expansion m  defense 
production capabilities that took place m  third world countries 
during the 1970s 38 Over thirty developing countries now produce 
major weapons systems aircraft, armored vehicles, missiles, and 
naval vessels 39 The value of major weapons manufactured in the 
third world from 1950-1984 totaled $12 7 billion (in constant 
1975 dollars) Ninety-two percent —  $11 7 billion worth —  of
16
total production occurred during the years 1970-1984 (43 percent, 
or $5 5 billion worth, took place during 1980-1984) 40
Despite the increase m  arms production capabilities and m  
the value of total defense output, defense manufacturing has not 
yet become a major industrial activity in the third world Data 
for the value of arms production, arms production as a percentage 
of GDP, and arms production as a percentage of total industrial 
production for the third world's top nine defense manufacturers 
are presented m  Table 7 As can be seen in the table, the 
figures for 1983 demonstrate that arms production is a rather 
minor economic enterprise Only in Israel did arms production 
contribute more than 0 4 percent of GDP in 1983 And again, only 
m  Israel did arms production comprise more than 1 1 percent of 
total industrial production m  1983 Militaristic industriali­
zation is not in evidence m  the third world, despite the 
concerns of some observers 41
War
It has often been noted that virtually all of the wars that 
have taken place since 1945 have occurred m  the third world 42 
Yet it is unclear whether the incidence of war m  the third world 
has increased or decreased over time As can be seen in Table 8, 
25 interstate and 32 intrastate wars were initiated in the 
developing world during the years 1945-1980 Of the 25 inter­
state wars, 15 were initiated during the years 1965-1980, as 
opposed to only 10 during the longer period 1945-1964 The 15
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interstate wars initiated during the years 1965-1980, however, 
resulted in substantially fewer battledeaths and lasted only 
slightly longer than the 10 wars initiated during the years 
1945-1954 (1,356,061 as opposed to 2,169,930 battledeaths and 336 
months as opposed to 316 months, respectively)
Of the 32 intrastate wars, 12 were initiated during the 
longer period 1945-1964 and 20 were started during the shorter 
period 1965-1980 The latter 20 wars resulted in larger 
casualties and lasted longer than the earlier wars
The number of interstate wars m  the third world, therefore, 
has been increasing, even though the length and severity of the 
wars have not increased The number of intrastate wars, on the 
other hand, has also been increasing, as has their length and 
severity
Military Regimes
The number of military-dominated regimes m  the third world 
has clearly increased In 1973, 33 out of 110 developing 
countries had military-dominated governments 43 In 1985, accord­
ing to data presented by Sivard, 56 out of 107 developing 
countries had military-controlled governments 44 Even though 
there are some coding problems with the Sivard data, it is clear 
that a greater proportion of third world regimes are now domi­
nated by the armed forces Militaries in Asia and Africa have 
not yet, evidently, begun to return to the barracks, as their 
counterparts in Latin America have Despite the trend toward
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democratization in Latin America, this dimension of militariza­
tion is apparently not yet on the wane However, military 
appropriation of the state apparatus may not result inevitably in 
militarization or militarism The military's usurpation of 
civilian roles and functions may well result m  the civilianiza- 
tion of the military rather than the militarization of polity and 
society 45
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CONCLUSION
The conceptualization of militarization provided here has 
allowed an empirical assessment of the extent of third world 
militarization It has been shown that concern about militariza­
tion is justified, but the trends for the six dimensions of 
militarization that have been identified and examined here are 
not all in the direction of ever increasing militarization Even 
though the number of wars fought in the third world, both 
interstate and intrastate, has apparently increased over time (at 
least through 1980), and the proportion of military-dominated 
regimes has increased to just under half of all third world 
regimes, indicators for the other four dimensions of militariza­
tion point to a slowing, and perhaps even a future halt or 
reversal, in the rate of growth of militarization The rate of 
growth of military spending has begun to decline and there is 
evidence of real declines in defense spending Armed forces 
growth rates have slowed to a crawl Arms imports are flat and 
m  some cases declining Military production, though increasing, 
remains, as Brzoska and Ohlson have pointed out, "a minor 
industrial activity "46 Militarization, therefore, while not yet 
on the wane, is not advancing as rapidly as it once was, and is 
barely holding its holding its own along four of the six dimen­
sions examined here Perhaps it is not too much to say that the 
"problem” of militarization in the third world has been somewhat 
overblown
20
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Table 1
Military Expenditures (MILEX) 
1973-1983
Year MILEX1 MILEX
(billion GNP
dollars) %
MILEX MILEX
CGE^ per capita3
%
All Developing Countries4
1973 95 3 5 4 22 5 32
1974 111 1 5 6 22 6 37
1975 129 2 6 2 22 2 42
1976 139 6 6 2 22 3 441977 137 8 5 8 20 3 43
1978 142 9 5 8 20 2 441979 145 6 5 6 19 5 441980 150 9 5 5 18 9 441981 158 3 5 7 19 1 451982 164 9 5 9 19 3 471983 162 6 5 8 18 5 45
Africa
1973 7 4 2 7 11 7 221974 8 4 2 8 11 6 241975 11 7 3 8 12 5 311976 13 3 4 1 13 2 351977 14 5 4 2 14 3 371978 15 2 4 4 15 1 371979 16 0 4 4 15 5 381980 14 6 3 9 13 7 341981 16 0 4 3 15 7 361982 16 1 4 4 15 1 351983 16 2 4 5 14 9 34
East Asia5
1973 46 9 4 0 22 4 331974 49 2 4 1 22 3 341975 51 4 4 1 21 5 351976 52 3 4 0 20 6 35
1977 53 6 3 9 19 5 35
1978 56 3 3 8 17 6 37
1979 62 6 4 0 17 8 40
1980 60 8 3 7 16 7 38
1981 61 9 3 6 16 8 38
1982 63 8 3 6 17 0 40
1983 64 6 3 5 16 2 40
Table 1 (cont )
Year MILEX MILEX MILEX MILEX
GNP CGE per capita
Latin America
1973 8 0 1 6 8 0 26
1974 8 5 1 5 7 2 27
1975 9 2 1 6 7 1 29
1976 10 2 1 7 7 6 31
1977 10 9 1 7 7 3 32
1978 10 5 1 6 6 8 30
1979 10 3 1 5 6 6 29
1980 11 0 1 5 6 3 30
1981 11 2 1 5 5 6 30
1982 12 0 1 6 5 5 30
1983 10 5 1 5 4 9 27
Middle East
1973 23 8 14 1 36 1 220
1974 34 4 13 0 34 0 308
1975 44 9 15 3 33 2 391
1976 52 5 15 2 33 4 443
1977 49 4 13 4 28 1 405
1978 51 2 14 6 30 2 406
1979 47 9 11 9 26 1 369
1980 55 0 12 3 25 8 412
1981 59 4 13 1 28 1 432
1982 62 9 14 5 27 8 445
1983 60 9 15 7 26 9 418
South Asia
1973 4 9 3 2 21 1 6
1974 5 0 3 2 21 2 6
1975 5 9 3 5 19 9 7
1976 6 0 3 4 18 8 7
1977 5 8 3 1 17 3 6
1978 6 3 3 1 16 3 7
1979 6 3 3 2 15 9 7
1980 6 7 3 2 15 8 7
1981 7 2 3 3 16 6 7
1982 7 9 3 5 17 0 8
1983 8 8 3 7 18 4 9
Source U S Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military 
Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1985. ACDA Publication 123, 
August 1985, pp 47-50
Notes
1 Billions of constant 1982 U S dollars
2 Central Government Expenditures
3 Constant 1982 dollars
4 As determined by the U S ACDA
5 ACDA's figures for East Asia, unfortunately, include data for 
one developed country —  Japan
i
Table 2
MILEX Growth Rates1 
1963-1983
1963-73
(%)
1973-83
(%)
1980-1
(%)
All Developing Countries 7 2 4 7 2 1
Africa 6 5 7 3 3 2
East Asia 7 5 11 8 2 1
Latin America 3 9 3 4 -0 7
Middle East 14 7 7 6 3 7
South Asia 2 9 5 3 9 5
Source U S Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military 
Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1963-1973. ACDA Publication 74, 
1975, pp 14-19, and U S Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 
World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1985, ACDA 
Publication 123, August 1985, p 4
Note
1 Average annual growth rates in percentages
Table 3
Armed Forces 1973-1983
Year Armed Forces
(thousand)
All Developing Countries1
Armed Forces 
per 1000 people
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
15096
16300
15640
15832
15760
16148
16430
16440
17230
17473
17528
5 2 
5 5 
5 1 
5 1 
5 0 
5 0 
5 0
4 9
5 0 
5 0 
4 9
Africa
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
East Asia2
933 2 8
962 2 8
1003 2 7
1092 2 9
1319 3 4
1313 3 3
1268 3 1
1295 3 1
1501 3 4
1547 3 4
1526 3 3
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
8031
8988
7847
7841
7850
8269
8424
8634
8867
8787
8547
5 8
6 3 
5 4 
5 3 
5 2 
5 4 
5 5 
5 5 
5 6 
5 5 
5 3
Year
Table 3 (cont )
Armed Forces 
(thousand)
Armed Forces 
per 1000 people
Latin America
1973 1208 4 0
1974 1248 4 1
1975 1297 4 1
1976 1328 4 1
1977 1436 4 3
1978 1484 4 4
1979 1488 4 3
1980 1548 4 3
1981 1585 4 3
1982 1656 4 4
1983 1715 4 5
Middle East
South Asia
1973 1283 11 9
1974 1406 12 6
1975 1648 14 7
1976 1764 14 9
1977 1499 12 3
1978 1580 12 5
1979 1759 13 5
1980 1828 13 7
1981 2026 14 7
1982 2124 15 1
1983 2114 14 5
1973 2313 3 0
1974 2350 3 0
1975 2452 3 0
1976 2362 2 8
1977 2182 2 6
1978 2102 2 4
1979 2082 2 4
1980 1724 1 9
1981 1817 2 0
1982 1878 2 0
1983 2119 2 2
Source U S Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military 
Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1985, ACDA Publication 123, 
August 1985, pp 47-50
Notes
1 As determined by the U S ACDA
2 ACDA's figures for East Asia, unfortunately, include data for 
one developed country —  Japan
Table 4
Armed Forces Growth Rates1
All Developing Countries2
Africa
East Asia3
Latin America
Middle East
South Asia
1963-1983
1963-73
(%)
1973-83
(%)
1980-83
(%)
3 8 1 3 0 3
9 0 5 5 -1 4
3 8 0 8 -2 7
2 2 3 5 3 6
6 7 4 6 -0 4
4 0 2 6 12 8
Source U S Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military 
Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1963-1973. (Washington, D C 
ACDA Publication 74, 1975), pp 14-19, and U S Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Trans­
fers 1985. (Washington, D C ACDA Publication 123, August 
1985), p 6
Note
1 Average annual rate of growth in percentages
2 As determined by the U S Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
3 The ACDA's data for East Asia, unfortunately, include data for 
one advanced industrial country —  Japan See note 42
Table 5
Arms Imports 1973-1983
Year Arms Imports1 Arms Imports
(million dollars) Total Imports
%
All Developing Countries1
1973 20122 8 7
1974 15969 4 7
1975 15295 4 1
1976 19322 5 2
1977 22683 5 4
1978 25606 5 6
1979 28689 5 7
1980 27654 4 6
1981 31588 5 3
1982 32080 5 9
1983 27501 5 7
Africa
1973 921 2 2
1974 1388 2 4
1975 2347 3 3
1976 4090 6 2
1977 4979 6 7
1978 7932 9 8
1979 6544 8 3
1980 6281 6 0
1981 6667 6 4
1982 6230 7 4
1983 4627 6 6
East Asia2
1973 8532 6 5
1974 4076 2 1
1975 3671 2 1
1976 2072 1 1
1977 1861 1 0
1978 2228 1 0
1979 4941 1 9
1980 4989 1 6
1981 3919 1 3
1982 3850 1 4
1983 3295 1 2
Table 5 (cont )
Arms Imports 
Total Imports 
%
Year Arms Imports
(million dollars)
Latin America
1973 1127 2 2
1974 838 1 0
1975 966 1 2
1976 1501 1 9
1977 1551 1 8
1978 2084 2 3
1979 2321 2 3
1980 2060 1 7
1981 2843 2 4
1982 3040 3 3
1983 2411 3 5
Middle East
1973 7345 21 5
1974 7565 14 7
1975 6383 9 3
1976 8746 11 3
1977 11343 11 7
1978 11504 11 1
1979 12224 11 7
1980 11435 9 1
1981 15206 11 3
1982 15685 11 2
1983 14898 12 2
South Asia
1973 882 7 7
1974 721 4 4
1975 537 2 9
1976 1173 7 6
1977 1603 9 5
1978 818 4 2
1979 1294 5 7
1980 1944 6 5
1981 2024 7 1
1982 2285 8 9
1983 1510 6 8
Source U S Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military 
Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1985, ACDA Publication 123, 
August 1984, pp 89-93
Notes
1 Millions of constant 1982 U S dollars
1 As determined by the U S ACDA
2 ACDA's figures for East Asia, unfortunately, include data for 
one developed country —  Japan
(Arms
All Developing Countries
Africa
East Asia
Latin America
Middle East
South Asia
Table 6
Import Growth Rates1
1973-1983
1973-83
(%)
1980-83
(%)
7 0 0 0
18 1 -9 4
1 9 -11 9
12 8 5 5
9 2 8 6
11 6 -6 2
Source U S Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military 
Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1985. ACDA Publication 123, 
August 1985, p 8
Note
1 Average annual growth rates m  percentages
Table 7
Arms Production, GDP, and Total Industrial Production
1983
Arms Production1 
(millions)
Arms Production 
GDP 
(%)
Arms Production 
Total Ind Prod 
(%)
Argentina 102 0 2 0 6
Brazil 84 0 1 0 2
Egypt 60 0 4 1 1
India 251 0 3 1 0
Israel 309 2 6 9 6
Korea, North 44 - -
Korea, South 61 0 1 0 4
South Africa 105 0 2 -
Taiwan 118 _
Sources Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson, eds , Appendix 1, 
Arms Production m  the Third World. (London and Philadelphia 
Taylor and Francis, 1986), pp 291-304, and World Bank, World 
Development Report 1985. (New York Oxford University Press, 
1985), pp 178-179
Note
1 Constant 1975 dollars
Table 8
Wars m  the Third World 
1945-1980
A Interstate Wars
Years Number of Wars 
Initiated
Duration
(months)
Battledeaths
1945-54 7 278 0 2,125,700
1955-64 3 38 1 44,230
1965-74 8 143 6 1,278,561
1975-80 7 182 4 77,500
B Intrastate Wars
Years Number of Wars Duration Battledeaths
Initiated (months)
1945-54 2 49 4 1,001,000
1955-64 10 386 8 787,500
1965-74 14 510 1 1,821,626
1975-80 6 193 2 96,500
Source Derived from data in Melvin Small and J David Singer, 
Resort to Wars International and Civil Wars. 1816-1980. 
(Beverly Hills Sage, 1982), pp 92-99 and 229-232
